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375 
Note 
Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research 
Tools 
Wendy Thai* 
INTRODUCTION 
The scope and propriety of the experimental use exemption 
to patent infringement liability have become a controversial 
topic among both the legal and scientific community.  Although 
the common law exemption has existed for almost 200 years, its 
applicability to academic research remained untested until 
Madey v. Duke University.1  In Madey, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit rejected a categorical exemption for 
university research activities, holding that the experimental 
use exemption is not applicable if the alleged infringing act 
furthers the university’s legitimate business and is not solely 
“for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry.”2  This decision was a rude awakening 
for the scientific community, which, for more than two decades, 
had assumed immunity from patent infringement liability 
under this common law exemption.3  In the only patent 
infringement case involving a university, the court had held 
that the defendant was not liable for contributory infringement 
as the use of infringing machines by a university was 
experimental and thus, did not amount to infringement.4  Even 
                                                          
 * J.D. expected 2005, University of Minnesota Law School.  This work 
was supported by the University of Minnesota’s Consortium on Law and 
Values in Health, Environment & the Life Sciences. 
 1. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 2. Id. at 1362. 
 3. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 
1018 (2003); see also S. Peter Ludwig & Jason C. Chumney, No Room for 
Experiment: the Federal Circuit’s Narrow Construction of the Experimental 
Use Defense, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 453 (2003). 
 4.. Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935), rev’d 
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as late as 1985, “[f]ew would deny the experimental use 
exception for research on patented technology performed at a 
university in furtherance of its educational function.”5  Yet 
today, in light of the increasing presence of universities in the 
intellectual property arena, many would deny just that.  Madey 
v. Duke University and the surrounding controversy is a case in 
point. 
The Madey case stemmed from a dispute between John 
Madey, inventor of the first free electron laser (FEL), and Duke 
University over management of the FEL research laboratory at 
Duke and access to equipments incorporating the FEL 
technology.6  When negotiations over control of the laboratory 
reached an impasse, John Madey resigned from the faculty at 
Duke and later brought patent infringement charges for 
continued exploitation of the FEL technology without his 
consent.7  Duke asserted the common law experimental use 
exemption in its defense, but this was ultimately rejected by 
the Federal Circuit on the ground that university research, 
though arguably having no commercial application, furthers 
the legitimate business objectives of universities and thus does 
not qualify for the “very narrow and strictly limited” 
experimental use exemption.8 
Although it is difficult to justify a different outcome under 
the particular facts of Madey,9 the “narrow and strictly limited” 
exemption set forth by the Federal Circuit has been met with 
much controversy.  The Madey court makes clear that 
universities wanting to avoid the risk of incurring patent 
infringement liability must, like everyone else, obtain the 
consent of patent holders prior to using patented technologies 
in their research.  Critics characterized the decision as 
“disastrous,”10 and one that “transforms the academic science 
                                                          
on other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936). 
 5. Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent 
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 633 (1985). 
 6. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352-53; see also Eliot Marshall, Physicist Sues 
Duke Over Control of Lab, 278 SCIENCE 1393 (1997). 
 7. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352-53. 
 8. Id. at 1362-63. 
 9. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use 
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 85 (2004) (discussing the facts 
of the Madey case and stating that “a judicial exemption of such research as 
noncommercial experimental use would have gutted the core grant of 
exclusivity supposedly provided by the patent”). 
 10. David Malakoff, Universities Ask Supreme Court to Reverse Patent 
Ruling, 299 SCIENCE 26, 27 (2003) (quoting Sheldon Steinbach, general 
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landscape in a horribly perverse way.”11  On the other hand, 
supporters contend that it serves to affirm the rights of the 
patent holder and is consistent with precedent and the 
underlying premise of patent law to promote scientific 
progress.12  They view the decision as one that will hold 
universities accountable for their commercial activities.13  The 
modern university, with its technology transfer office, patent 
portfolios, and corporate-sponsored research projects, is 
increasingly taking on the role of a market participant and 
shedding its traditional role as a disinterested steward of 
knowledge.14  Viewed in this context, Madey undeniably 
appeals to one’s sense of justice and fair play. 
In practice, however, and particularly as applied to 
biotechnology and biomedical research, a narrow and strictly 
limited exemption confers little practical benefit to patent 
holders at the expense of imposing detrimental obstacles to 
university research.  Patent law places the responsibility of 
enforcing patents on patent holders, but detecting infringement 
in university research activity can be a challenge for patent 
holders who have no effective means to police the use of 
technologies in university laboratories.15  Even when infringing 
activity is known, patent holders have tended to be reluctant to 
                                                          
counsel of the American Council on Education in Washington, D.C.). 
 11. Id. at 26 (quoting David Korn of the Association of American Medical 
Colleges in Washington, D.C.). 
 12. See Theodore B. Olson et al., Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S 958 (2003), reprinted in 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 511, 515 
[hereinafter Brief] (“When the public is permitted to engage in the unlicensed 
use of patented inventions without incurring liability for infringement, even 
with respect to ‘experimental’ uses that may offer other scientific benefits, the 
incentives provided by the patent laws are diminished and the nature of the 
patent ‘bargain’ altered.”). 
 13. See, e.g., David B. Resnik, Patents and the Research Exemption, 299 
SCIENCE 821 (2003). 
 14. Id. at 821; Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1018-19; Ludwig & Chumney, 
supra note 3, at 453. 
 15. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual 
Property Right, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2657-58 (1994) (discussing the 
application of the Coase Theorem to inventor/infringer interactions and 
stating that in the intellectual property rights context, “there is no smoky soot 
or wandering cattle to serve as an unambiguous marker” of infringement); see 
also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive 
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1071-72 (1989) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science] (“Making and 
using a patented invention within a research laboratory is not very 
conspicuous and may never come to the attention of the patent holder.”). 
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enforce their patents against universities as the prospective 
gains do not justify the risk of having their patents invalidated 
or the scope of their patents narrowed in an infringement 
suit.16  To the extent that this is true, a narrow experimental 
use exemption may have little impact on the patent holder’s 
decision to assert her patent against university infringers, and 
thus confers little tangible benefits.  For university researchers, 
on the other hand, the impact is less benign.  Recent judicial 
and federal patent policies have led to a proliferation of patents 
in the biomedical field that increasingly cover upstream 
technologies used as tools of laboratory research.17  In response, 
university researchers have adopted working solutions, 
including outright patent infringement, to circumvent the delay 
and high transaction costs associated with obtaining access to 
patented technologies.18  But patent infringement is a risky 
working solution in a post-Madey era.  Without the law on their 
side, the fates of universities are at the discretion and good 
grace of patent holders whose interests are increasingly 
antithetical to that of universities.  In sum, the current law 
confers little tangible benefits to patent holders, while placing 
university researchers between the Charybdis of uncertainty in 
relying on the forbearance of patent holders and the Scylla of 
bearing the costs and delays associated with having to obtain 
licenses ex ante. 
This article sets out a method for facilitating access to 
patented research tools so as to maximize the benefit to patent 
holders and university researchers alike.  The method includes 
a self-reporting mechanism by which a university user discloses 
the use of patented research tools when a patent application is 
filed covering the results of that research.  This disclosure 
requirement serves to notify patent holders that their patented 
technologies have been used, and by requiring disclosure at the 
time a patent application is filed, universities are held 
accountable, as are other market participants, for their 
commercial activities.  The method also includes a 
predetermined research fee associated with each research tool 
                                                          
 16. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 
SCIENCE 1021 (2003) (stating “small prospective gains from a lawsuit were not 
worth the legal fees, the risk of the patent being narrowed or invalidated, and 
the bad publicity from suing a university”). 
 17. See id.; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
 18. Walsh et al., supra note 16. 
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patent to be applied to university users.  This research fee 
allows the patent holder to name her price while serving to 
notify a prospective university user of the cost of a selected 
research tool, thus protecting university from disgorging.  In 
essence, the proposed model functions as a shortcut to facilitate 
access to patented research tools and thereby promotes 
efficiency in research by circumventing the need to obtain 
consent ex ante. 
The first part of this paper will be a discussion of the 
relevant aspects of U.S. patent laws.  This is followed by a brief 
description of the patent environment in biotechnology and the 
issues related to gaining access to patented research tools.  
Next, the paper will include a discussion of the distinction 
between liability and property rules, as well as compulsory 
licensing models that have been proposed in the legal 
literature.  Finally, this article will describe a possible solution 
that involves adoption of a self-disclosure requirement and a 
predetermined research fee for use of patented research tools 
by university researchers. 
I.  PATENT AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWS 
GENERALLY 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to 
promote the “Progress of Science” by giving “Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”19  Thus, federal patent 
law gives the holder of a patent the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale or selling the patented 
technology.20  The right to exclude is not a natural right but 
rather one conferred by law and given only if statutory 
requirements are met.  To be patentable, an invention must be 
of a statutorily prescribed subject matter;21 it must also meet 
the statutory requirements of utility,22 novelty,23 and non-
obviousness.24  To obtain a patent, the inventor must timely file 
a patent application25 that adequately discloses and claims the 
invention to be patented.26  An adequate disclosure is one that 
                                                          
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). 
 21. Id. § 101. 
 22. Id. § 112. 
 23. Id. § 102.  
 24. Id. § 103. 
 25. Id. § 102. 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
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describes the invention in sufficient detail so as to enable a 
person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention to make 
and to use the invention.27  In addition, the inventor also 
discloses in the patent specification what she believes to be the 
relevant field of art, the state of that art, and existing problems 
that the invention addresses.28  During the patent procurement 
process, the inventor and all involved are bound by a duty of 
candor and good faith that requires disclosure of information 
material to patentability.29  The duty of candor and good faith 
can be met by submitting an information disclosure statement 
that includes a list of patents, publications, applications or 
other information.30 
Once a patent is issued, the patent holder bears the 
responsibility for enforcing her patent.  Since a patent gives the 
holder the right to exclude others from practicing the invention, 
anyone who makes, uses, or sells a patented invention without 
the patent holder’s consent infringes the patent.31  In response, 
the patent holder can bring a civil patent infringement suit.32  
The remedies available to the patent holder include an 
injunction to prevent further infringement33 and damages as 
compensation for past infringement.34 
II.  PATENT INFRINGEMENT DEFENSES 
A patent holder’s right to recover from what otherwise 
would be infringing activity is not absolute.  Although a patent 
carries a presumption of validity, an accused infringer can 
challenge its validity by showing a failure to satisfy the 
patentability requirements.  A showing that the patent 
disclosure is not enabling, for example, would render the patent 
invalid and thus unenforceable.35  In addition, a showing that 
                                                          
 27. Id. 
 28. 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2001); PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(a), (c) (8th 
ed. 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html. 
 29. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2001). 
 30. Id. §§ 1.56, 1.97-.98. 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 32. Id. § 281. 
 33. Id. § 283. 
 34. Id. § 284. 
 35. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a claim to nucleic acid sequences that encode erythropoietin and 
other polypeptides having the same biological activity invalid and 
unenforceable on the ground that the specification did not enable one skilled 
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the patent holder had violated the duty of candor and good 
faith during the patent procurement process by intentionally 
engaging in fraud or inequitable conduct such as intentionally 
submitting false or misleading information, or misrepresenting 
or failing to disclose information that was material to 
patentability, would render the patent unenforceable under the 
equitable principle of unclean hands.36 
A patent holder’s right to recovery has also been limited by 
the common law experimental use exemption initially 
formulated in 1813.  The common law exemption is presumed 
to be incorporated into the definition of infringement provided 
by section 271(a) of the 1952 Patent Act.37  The experimental 
use exemption doctrine originated from Justice Joseph Story’s 
opinion in Whittemore v. Cutter.38  In Whittemore, Cutter was 
sued for infringement of a patent on a machine for making 
cotton and wool cards.39  Having lost the suit, Cutter moved for 
a new trial on various grounds, one of which was an objection to 
the court’s statement “that the making of a machine fit for use, 
and with a design to use it for profit, was an infringement of 
the patent right, for which an action was given by the 
statute.”40  In response, Justice Story affirmed the trial judge’s 
charge stating: “it could never have been the intention of the 
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine 
merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of 
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its 
described effects.”41  In a subsequent case, Justice Story stated 
“the making of a patented machine to be an offence . . . must be 
the making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the 
mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the 
verity and exactness of the specification.”42 
                                                          
in the art to make and use a representative number of the claimed sequences). 
 36. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp. and Toshiba Am. 
Elec. Components, Inc., 231 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Molins PLC v. 
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm 
Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1048 (Fed.Cir.1995); Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co. v. 
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 
Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent 
Litigation, 7 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993). 
 37. See Brief, supra note 12, at 515 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 (1961)). 
 38. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (1813) (No. 17,600). 
 39. Id. at 1121. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (1813) (No. 12,391). 
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Early common law recognized the applicability of the 
exemption to the use of a patented technology “for the sole 
purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for 
mere amusement . . . .”43  More recent cases that further 
delineate the boundaries of the exemption indicate that uses 
that are “in keeping with the legitimate business” of the alleged 
infringer do not qualify for the exemption.44  In these cases, the 
court found that either (1) there was no evidence that the 
alleged infringing activity was solely for experimental 
purposes; or (2) the alleged infringing activity had commercial 
purposes. 
In Pitcairn v. United States,45 for example, the government 
was required to compensate the inventor for use of helicopters 
incorporating patented rotor structures and control systems 
that were manufactured without a license even though the use 
was “for testing, evaluational, demonstrational or experimental 
purposes.”46  In this case, there was no evidence that the use 
was “solely for experimental purposes.”47  Experimental use 
was not a defense because “experiments of such nature are 
intended uses of the infringing aircraft . . . and are in keeping 
with the legitimate business of the using agency.”48 
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc,49 
the Federal Circuit held that Bolar was liable for patent 
infringement when it used a patented drug owned by Roche in 
a bioequivalency test necessary to obtain U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval for a generic version of the 
patented drug.50  Bolar argued that its tests using a patented 
drug “are ‘true scientific inquiries’ to which a literal 
interpretation of the experimental use exception logically 
should extend.”51  The Federal Circuit rejected this 
construction of the exemption, holding that the exemption was 
“truly narrow,” and a broad construction, according to the 
court, would “allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of 
                                                          
 43. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (1861) (No. 11,279). 
 44. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Roche Prod., 
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Embrex v. Service 
Eng’g Corp. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
      45.  547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
 46. Id. at 1125. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1125-26. 
 49.  733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 50. Id. at 863. 
 51. Id. 
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‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, 
and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”52  “Bolar’s 
intended ‘experimental’ use [was] solely for business reasons 
and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry.”53  Relying on precedent, the Federal 
Circuit stated that “‘experiments . . . in keeping with the 
legitimate business of the . . . [alleged infringer]’ are 
infringements for which ‘[e]xperimental use is not a defense.’”54 
Similarly, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp,55 a 
failed experiment conducted to design around the claims of a 
patent was deemed to be an infringing use.56  Service 
Engineering Corporation (SEC) had retained two researchers to 
“investigate the possibility of injecting chicken embryos outside 
the region covered by the . . . patent claims,” but the 
researchers failed, and the “tests showed that . . . most 
injections penetrated [into the] areas covered by the . . . 
patent.” 57  The Federal Circuit rejected SEC’s argument that 
these experiments were protected by the experimental use 
exemption as the exemption was narrowly construed.58  Thus, 
SEC was liable for patent infringement since the experiments 
were conducted “expressly for commercial purposes.”59 
Madey v. Duke University60 was the first case in which the 
applicability of the experimental use exemption to university 
research activities was challenged.  In Madey, the Federal 
Circuit stated that the exemption would not apply if the alleged 
infringing use was in keeping with the university’s legitimate 
business and was not “solely for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”61  With respect 
to the “legitimate business” prong of the analysis, the court 
stated that research projects, arguably having no commercial 
applications, nonetheless further a university’s legitimate 
business objectives, which included “educating and 
enlightening students and faculty, . . . increase[ing] the status 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl. 
1976)). 
      55. Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
 56. Id. at 1346. 
 57. Id. at 1346-47. 
  58. Id. at 1349. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 61. Id. at 1362-63. 
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of the institution and lur[ing] lucrative research grants, 
students, and faculty.”62 
In addition to the common exemption, Congress has also 
provided a statutory exemption to infringement liability under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) which codifies a part of the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.63  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
was a response to lobbying efforts by the generic drug industry 
to circumvent the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche Products.  
The generic drug industry argued that because generic drug 
manufacturers could not begin bio-equivalency studies with a 
patented drug until the patent term expires, the patent holder, 
in effect, gained a de facto extension of the drug’s patent term 
by the length of time necessary to obtain FDA approval for the 
generic drug.64  Thus, section 271(e) provides that uses of 
patented drugs solely for purposes reasonably related to 
obtaining regulatory approval are exempt from patent 
infringement liability.65  Most recently, the Federal Circuit has 
held that the exemption in section 271(e) does not encompass 
“exploratory research that may rationally form only a predicate 
for future FDA clinical tests” such as preclinical drug screening 
that would lead to clinical trials and the production of data for 
the regulatory approval process.66  Section 271(e) has also been 
interpreted, however, to encompass the testing of medical 
devices.67 
In enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, it is thought that 
Congress did not intend to preempt the entire common law 
experimental use doctrine.  Both the legislative history of the 
Act and subsequent case law from the Federal Circuit and 
lower courts is consistent with this proposition.68  In addition, 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 1362. 
 63. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).  See Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante 
Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for 
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2001). 
 64. Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 864. (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
 65. Mueller, supra note 63, at 25. 
 66. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
 67. Mueller, supra note 63, at 12.  See Intermedics Inc. v. Ventritex Co. 
775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 68. Mueller, supra note 63, at 26-32. 
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there is evidence to support the proposition that in creating a 
category of activity that is exempted from infringement liability 
under section 271(e), Congress did not intend to preclude other 
types of experimental use from liability exemption.69  The 
introduction of House Report (H.R.) 4970, the “Transgenic 
Animal Patent Reform Act,” by Representative Kastenmeier in 
1988, has been cited in support of this proposition.70  This bill 
would have exempted from patent infringement the breeding, 
use and selling of transgenic animals by farmers.71  Although 
the bill passed the House in September 13, 1988, no further 
action was taken after it was referred to a Senate committee.72  
A more recent example is H.R. 3967, the Genomic Research and 
Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, introduced by 
Representative Lynn Rivers of Michigan.73  This bill would 
have exempted from patent infringement researchers who use 
patented genetic sequence information for noncommercial 
research purposes; it was analogous to the “fair use” doctrine in 
copyright law that “permits socially valuable uses without a 
license.”74  No further action was taken after H.R. 3967 was 
referred to the House Judiciary Committee.75 
III.  PATENTS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Patent laws as applied to discoveries in biotechnology have 
experienced significant developments in the last twenty-five 
years in response to rapid scientific advances.  Recombinant 
DNA methodology, for example, was developed in 1973.76  The 
technology allowed foreign genes to be introduced into a 
selected host organism, thus enabling the creation of 
genetically engineered organisms with new and useful traits.  
One such organism is a bacterium engineered by Ananda M. 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 26-27. 
 70. Id. at 27 n.132. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. H.R. 3967, 106th Cong. (2002) at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03967:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). 
 74. See OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY & ANALYSIS, Legislative Updates, 
107th Congress, Gene Patenting, H.R. 3966 and H.R. 3967, at 
http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/107/pendinglegislation/9gene.asp (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2004). 
 75. Id. 
 76. BERNARD R. GLICK & JACK J. PASTERNAK, MOLECULAR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS OF RECOMBINANT DNA 6 (2d 
ed. 1998). 
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Chakrabarty to break down components of crude oil.77  The 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected 
Mr. Chakrabarty’s application for patent on the engineered 
bacterium on the ground that living things were a product of 
nature and thus could not be patented.78  The Supreme Court, 
however, upheld the patentability of the organism stating that 
anything made by man, whether living or otherwise, was 
patentable.79 
Development of DNA sequencing technology also led to 
significant developments in patent law.  Techniques for 
determining the sequence of DNA were first developed in 1976, 
and the first commercial automated DNA synthesizer was sold 
in 1981.80  Continued advances in DNA sequencing technology 
resulted in determination of the genomic sequences of diverse 
organisms such as mosquito, mouse, rice, and human, 81 which 
in turn spurred the patenting of nucleic acids such as DNA 
molecules.  Although the patenting of DNA molecules has also 
been controversial, Federal Circuit treatment of nucleic acid 
patents has, arguably, facilitated their patentability.  For 
example, to satisfy the written description requirement of 
section 112 as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, claims 
covering nucleic acids must be supported by a description in the 
patent specification of the nucleic acid’s “structure, formula, 
chemical name or physical properties.”82  A disclosure in the 
specification of the sequence of a polypeptide and a method for 
isolating nucleic acids that encode these polypeptides were 
deemed insufficient to satisfy the written description 
requirement.83  Even though knowledge of a polypeptide 
sequence is sufficient to isolate the corresponding nucleic acid 
using routine methodologies, such knowledge alone is 
insufficient for the experimenter to predict the exact nucleic 
                                                          
 77. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 78. Id. at 306. 
 79. Id. at 310, 313. 
 80. GLICK & PASTERNAK, supra note 76. 
 81. See generally National Center for Biotechnology Information, Genome 
Resources, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genomes/index.html (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2004). 
 82. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology 
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1174-77 (2002) (discussing the 
Federal Circuit’s invalidation of nucleic acid claims in Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 
1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 
F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 83. Id. 
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acid that would be obtained.84  Similarly, public knowledge of a 
polypeptide sequence and methodology for isolating the 
corresponding nucleic acid does not render obvious a claim to a 
particular nucleic acid that encodes the polypeptide of 
interest.85  The combined effect of the Federal Circuit’s 
application of the written description and non-obviousness 
requirements to claims covering nucleic acids has been 
postulated to lead to a large number of DNA patents, though 
with narrow coverage.86 
Advances in biotechnology and the corresponding 
developments in patent law have led to a proliferation of 
patents covering biotechnology discoveries.87  From 1990 to 
2000, for example, the number of patents granted by the 
USPTO in the field of biotechnology had risen by fifteen 
percent annually compared with a five percent rise in all 
patents.88  A particular concern with the proliferation of 
patents covering biotechnology discoveries is the fact that these 
patents cover fundamental research discoveries such as 
disease-related genes, functional genetic elements, and 
transgenic animals that are necessary for further downstream 
research.89  Such upstream patents impede downstream 
research and development when patent holders restrict the 
availability of patented research tools, demand excessive 
licensing fees, or impose restrictive licensing terms.90  Another 
facet of the problem has been described as the “tragedy of the 
anticommons” in which the fragmentation of intellectual 
property rights in an innovation creates a situation in which it 
is difficult to obtain a complete set of licenses for research into 
the subject area of the innovation.91  To illustrate, in a 
                                                          
 84. See id. at 1178-79 for a more extensive discussion of the biological 
relationship between polypeptides and nucleic acids. 
 85. Id. at 1177-79 (discussing In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993), In 
re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and the Federal Circuit’s application of 
the non-obviousness standard). 
 86. Id. at 1181-82. 
 87. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 5-6. 
 88. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PATENTS AND INNOVATION: 
TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 22 (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/24508541.pdf. 
 89. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 7-8 (discussing difficulties in gaining 
access to patents covering DNA sequences, nucleic acid vectors, and transgenic 
mice); see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the 
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (2004). 
 90. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 7-8. 
 91. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 699. 
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discussion paper on the ethics of DNA patenting, the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics reported that over twenty U.S. patents 
were implicated in the development of a malaria vaccine: five 
core U.S. patents relate to the MSP-1, a protein produced by 
the malaria parasite; a dozen other patents relate to “add-on” 
technologies such as nucleic acid sequences useful in 
constructing a vaccine; and an additional five relate to the 
production of MSP-1 vaccines.92  In these cases, even if the 
necessary technologies are available for licensing, the delay and 
transaction costs associated with obtaining licenses would 
impede downstream research.93  These hurdles are further 
exacerbated by the universities’ lack of expertise in handling 
multiple licensing transactions.94 
Further complicating the issue is the fact that universities 
have become active participants in the patent market.  In 1980, 
to facilitate technology transfer from federally-sponsored 
research to the industry, the Bayh-Dole Act95 and the 
Stevenson-Wydler Act96 were passed.  The Bayh-Dole Act, in 
                                                          
 92. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA, 
43 (July 20, 2002), available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/ 
patentingdna/publication_310.html; see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 
17, at 699 (noting that there were more than 100 issued U.S. patents in which 
the term “adrenergic receptor” is found in the claim). 
 93. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 700; see also Malakoff, supra 
note 10, at 26 (stating that universities believe research would be hindered if 
scientists are forced to obtain permission from before using patented 
technologies); id. at 27 (quoting  Sheldon Steinbach, general counsel of the 
American Council on Education as saying that it would be “'disastrous' . . .  if 
researchers have to stop and conduct expensive, time-consuming patent 
searches and make licensing deals every time they want to bring a new 
technology or technique into the lab."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over 
the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this Market Failing or Emerging, 
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223, 225 
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds, 2001) (stating that there is a widely 
shared perception among scientists and university technology transfer 
professionals that “negotiations over the transfer of proprietary research tools 
present a considerable and growing obstacle to progress in biomedical research 
and product development” and further that “[s]cientists report having to wait 
months or even years to carry out experiments while their institutions 
attempt to renegotiate the terms of ‘Material Transfer Agreements’ . . . 
database access agreements, and patent license agreements”). 
 94. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 700. 
 95. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000) (commonly known as the 
“Bayh-Dole Act”). 
 96. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
480, § 2, 94 Stat. 2311-2320 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-
3715 (2000)). 
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particular, allowed universities to retain title to federally-
funded research discoveries and required that universities seek 
patent protection for federally-funded inventions for which they 
elect to retain title.97  As a result, the number of universities 
engaged in technology transfer has experienced an eight-fold 
increase between 1980 and 2000, accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in patenting and licensing activities.98  
In addition to their significant patenting and licensing 
activities, universities are also placing restrictions on the 
dissemination of research materials that may prove 
commercially valuable in downstream research.99  As 
universities become increasingly significant participants in the 
intellectual property market, it becomes more difficult to justify 
a research exemption even in light of the burdensome 
transaction costs associated with gaining access to patents 
covering upstream technologies.  Michelle Walters, for example, 
has argued that when an invention is patented and the 
university derives monetary benefits, then the experimental 
use exemption may be inapplicable.100  The Madey court cited 
Duke University’s “aggressive patent licensing program” to 
support rejection of a categorical experimental use exemption 
for university research activity.101 
IV.  PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES 
Numerous proposals have been made to modify the 
                                                          
 97. See COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A 
GUIDE TO THE LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS (1999), at 
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/bayh.html. 
 98. Assoc. of Univ. Tech. Managers, Surveys – Bayh-Dole Act (2000), at 
http://www.autm.net/pubs/survey/facts.html (reporting that (1) fewer than 250 
U.S. patents were issued to universities annually prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, 
while more than 2,000 patents were issued annually to universities in the late 
1990’s, and (2) a 133 % increases in licenses between 1991 and 1999); cf. Rai & 
Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 291-92 (noting that the number of patents issued 
to universities annually had increased from 264 in 1979 to 2,436 in 1997 
compared to the two-fold increase in all patents); Assoc. of Univ. Tech. 
Managers, Surveys – Common Questions & Answers About Technology 
Transfer (2000), at http://www.autm.net/pubs/survey/qa.html (reporting that 
3,914 new licenses agreements were signed by universities in 1999, a 129 % 
increase from 1991). 
 99. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 291. 
 100. Michelle Walters, De Minimis Use and Experimental Use Exceptions to 
Patent Infringement: A Comment on the Embrex Concurrence, 29 AIPLA Q. J. 
509, 537 (2001). 
 101. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63, n.7 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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experimental use exemption to address the concern that 
patents on upstream discoveries would hinder downstream 
research.102  Many of these advocate the adoption of a liability 
rule approach to facilitate access to patented research tools.103  
The United States patent system implements a property rule 
by recognizing in the patent holder a right to exclude others 
from her property.104  The patent holder is empowered with the 
right to seek damages for past infringement as well as the right 
to injunctive relief to prevent future infringement.105  Under a 
liability-rule system, however, a patent holder is entitled to be 
compensated for encroachment on her property in lieu of the 
right to exclude.106  In addition, the amount of compensation is 
objectively determined by the state rather than by the parties 
involved.107  A property rule is the method of choice in the 
context in which transaction costs associated with allocating 
property rights between the property owner and others are low 
relative to the costs related to determining damages and 
compensation after encroachment has taken place.108  In 
contrast, a liability rule is useful when the transaction costs of 
bargaining are high.109 
Liability rules tend to be the exception applied when the 
public interest in broader access to a patented invention is 
deemed to be more important than the private interest of the 
                                                          
 102. See e.g., Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, supra note 15; 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems 
with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163 [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patenting 
Research Tools]; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in 
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Mueller, supra note 63; 
Strandburg, supra note 9; David C. Hoffman, A Modest Proposal: Toward 
Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad 
Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (2004). 
 103. See e.g., Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, supra note 15; 
Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools, supra note 102; Mueller, supra note 63; 
Hoffman, supra note 102. 
 104. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1092 (1971). 
 105. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2000). 
 106. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 104, at 1092. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. at 1106 (stating “[o]ften the cost of establishing the value of an 
initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the 
entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur” as 
justification for the need for liability rules). 
THAI_N1 12/29/2004  1:59:08 PM 
2004] TOWARD FACILITATING ACCESS 391 
 
patent holder.110  In these cases, the patent holder is “forced to 
tolerate, against his will, the exploitation of his invention” by 
another.111  This hostility towards the rights of patent holders 
contributes, in part, to the unpopularity of liability rule-based 
approaches such as compulsory licensing in the United 
States.112 
An additional argument against a liability-rule approach in 
general emphasizes the difficulty in implementation, since 
there are no effective methods of detection and valuation.113  
The difficulty in detecting infringement stems from the 
abstract nature of intellectual property.  In contrast to “[a] 
farmer adjacent to a cattle ranch [who] will normally have no 
trouble determining when cattle have trampled her crops,” in 
the intellectual property context, “there is no smoky soot or 
wandering cattle to serve as an unambiguous marker . . . .  
Creators very often work far away from each other, and at 
different times.”114  Particularly illustrative are patented 
research tools.  “[R]esearch tool[s],” as defined by the National 
Institutes of Health Working Group on Research Tools, 
encompass “the full range of resources that scientists use in the 
laboratory” and include “cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, 
reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial 
chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning 
tools . . . .”115  When the use of research tools is not disclosed in 
some way, for example, when the tool is not incorporated into 
the final product or the use is not disclosed as part of a 
publication or patent specification, it can be difficult for the 
                                                          
 110. JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY 
LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA 
AND THE USA 21 (2003), at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/projectoutputs.htm. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools, supra note 102, at 174 
(stating that if modification of the experimental use exemption to deny patent 
holders an injunctive remedy but permitting recovery of a reasonable royalty 
as damages is perceived as a compulsory licensing, it “may be opposed 
throughout the industry” and then suggesting that an exemption that denies a 
damage remedy altogether is preferable because this “would seem less like a 
compulsory license provision . . . although ultimately more hostile to the 
interests of patent holders”). 
 113. See Merges, supra note 15, at 2657-60. 
 114. Id. at 2658. 
 115. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 11 (quoting NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH (NIH), REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS 3 
(1998), at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm). 
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patent holder to detect that use.  With respect to valuation, in a 
liability rule-based approach, the difficulty results from the 
“abstract quality of the benefits” conferred by intellectual 
property and their “cumulative, interdependent nature,” both of 
which lead to disagreements as to whether and to what extent 
a prior work added to the subsequent one.116  In addition, the 
uniqueness of the intellectual property contributes to the 
difficulty in determining value by a third party.117  These 
difficulties can lead to undervaluation or overvaluation and 
result in undercompensation or overcompensation.  In a 
property rule-based approach in which the parties are left to 
bargain for the value of the exchange, the heterogeneous 
interests and cognitive biases of the parties involved become 
obstacles in arriving at an agreed value for the exchange.118  
Cognitive biases, such as overestimating the likelihood that 
one’s own asset among multiple potential options would be the 
critical contribution or overvaluing one’s own asset while 
undervaluing that of others, postulated to be pervasive among 
scientists, could interfere with successful bargaining.119 
V.  CRAFTING AN EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION – 
EXISTING MODELS 
Professor Janice Mueller has addressed the above concerns 
in her model proposing a liability rule approach for regulating 
access to patented research tools.120  In her model, the research 
tool user is required to notify the patent holder of the intended 
use as well as any products about to be marketed that have 
been developed from that use.121  Those failing to provide notice 
to the patent holder would be subject to treble damages once 
infringement is established.122  The model employs a reach-
through royalty structure to compensate the patent holder for 
use of a patented research tool.123  The reach-through royalty 
structure links royalty payments to the patent holder with the 
commercial value of any products developed from the use of the 
                                                          
 116. See Merges, supra note 15, at 2658-59. 
 117. Id. at 2664. 
 118. See Eisenberg & Heller, supra note 17, at 701. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Mueller, supra note 63. 
 121. Id. at 58-59. 
 122. Id. at 59. 
 123. Id. at 58. 
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patented research tool.124  The model applies to research tools 
not readily available for licensing on reasonable terms or via 
anonymous marketplace purchase.125  The term “research tools” 
encompasses tools used in the “development of new 
biotechnological or pharmaceutical products that do not 
themselves physically incorporate the tool.”126  The 
development use model’s focus on commercial products and 
royalties determined from sales, profits and production costs 
renders it less suitable for the university research tool user if 
the “products” developed from that use take the form of 
patents.  One way to adapt Professor Mueller’s model to the 
university setting would be to link royalty payments with 
patent licensing revenues rather than sales of marketed 
products. 
Recently, Professor Katherine Strandburg has proposed 
another approach to crafting the experimental use exemption 
that relies on the distinction between “experimenting on” and 
“experimenting with” a patented invention.127  Professor 
Strandburg defined “experimenting on” as “experimentation 
aimed at verifying, designing around, or improving upon a 
patented invention,”128 while “‘[e]xperimenting with’ is 
experimentation in which a patented invention is used . . . as a 
research tool.”129  She proposed that “experimenting on” a 
patented invention should be broadly permitted without regard 
to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the user as the 
experiment has little impact on the incentive to invent.130  In 
contrast, she proposed a limited exemption for “experimenting 
with” a patented research tool in which the patentee is given an 
initial period of complete exclusivity followed by a period of 
compulsory licensing.131 
Noting the difficulty in applying the experimenting on/with 
distinction in the biotechnology context, Professor Strandburg 
stated that an infringing experimentation falls into the 
“experimenting on” category if the infringement could have 
been avoided in principle by more information about the 
                                                          
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Mueller, supra note 63, at 14. 
 127. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 88-89. 
 128. Id. at 88. 
 129. Id. at 89. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 90. 
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patented invention.132  Yet this standard is also difficult to 
apply.  To illustrate, Professor Strandburg applied this test to 
the infringing experiments in Integra Lifesciences.133  In this 
case, Merck was found liable for patent infringement when its 
researchers conducted biochemical experiments using peptides 
drug candidates that fell within the generic class of peptides 
patented by Integra Lifesciences.134  Applying the above test, 
Professor Strandburg concluded that the Integra experiments 
fell into the “experimenting on” category for several reasons.  
The purpose of the experiments was to learn more about the 
new peptides; and if the new peptides were within the scope of 
the more generic peptide patented, then experiments using the 
new peptides would have been conducted to better understand 
the patented invention.135  However, the purpose of the Integra 
experiments was to develop new treatment for cancer, diabetic 
retinopathy and other conditions,136 rather than to better 
understand the nature of these peptides.  More specifically, Dr. 
David Cheresh, a researcher at Scripps, had discovered a 
mechanism for interfering with angiogenesis, and this 
discovery was of interest to Merck because inhibiting 
angiogenesis is a potential method of halting tumor growth.137  
As a result, Merck “hired Scripps and Dr. Cheresh to identify 
potential drug candidates that might inhibit angiogenesis,” and 
this led to the discovery of particular peptides that were 
ultimately found to infringe Integra’s patents.138  Merck and 
Scripps then entered into an agreement to “fund the necessary 
experiments ‘to satisfy the biological basis and regulatory 
(FDA) requirements for the implementation of clinical trials’ 
with EMD66203;” this agreement “contemplated commencing 
clinical trials with a drug candidate within three years.”139  
Thus, Merck’s interest in the peptides stemmed from their 
potential usefulness as drugs and Merck’s primary purpose was 
to find new treatments for disease conditions.  Put another 
way, the experimentation found to be infringing was conducted 
                                                          
 132. Id. at 148. 
 133. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 149. 
 134. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
 135. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 149. 
 136. Integra Lifesciences I, 331 F.3d at 863. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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for the purpose of gaining better understanding of how tumor 
growth could be suppressed by inhibitors of angiogenesis, and 
the infringing peptides were the necessary tools in this 
endeavor.  In sum, an experimental use exemption that relies 
on an experimenting on/with distinction may be difficult to 
apply in the biotechnology context. 
VI.  A DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT AND A 
PREDETERMINED RESEARCH FEE FOR UNIVERSITY 
USERS? 
This article sets out another approach that will provide 
universities with a mechanism for unfettered access to 
patented research tools, while at the same time facilitating 
recovery by the patent holder for that use.  The proposed model 
is to be applied when the user of patented technology is a 
university researcher.  It incorporates the definition of research 
tools set out by Professor Janice Mueller.140  Thus, the term 
“research tools” refers to all patented tools used in 
biotechnology research that do not become physically 
incorporated into a product that is ultimately marketed.141  In 
addition, only those “research tools” that are not readily 
available for licensing on reasonable terms, or not available via 
anonymous marketplace purchase, are included.142  The 
proposed model is triggered when a university becomes a 
participant in the intellectual property market.  Once a 
university becomes a market participant, the model imposes a 
research tool disclosure requirement on the university user.  
The model also requires all patent holders stipulate to a 
predetermined research fee to be applied to university users.  
The following is a discussion of the various aspects of the 
present model and how each addresses the concerns raised 
above. 
A.  THE UNIVERSITY AS A MARKET PARTICIPANT 
The proposed model is based on the premise that when a 
university participates in the market it should be treated as all 
other market participants.143  A university is deemed to be a 
per se market participant when it seeks patent protection for its 
                                                          
 140. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 14. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. at 15, 58. 
 143. See Walters, supra note 100. 
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research.  Thus, the university’s obligation to compensate the 
patent holder when a research tool has been used in research is 
triggered when the university files a patent application 
covering the results of that research.  The university has no 
obligation to compensate the patent holder when the result of 
research is dedicated to the public by publication without 
patenting.  Thus, in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances, unless and until the university files a patent 
application, it incurs no liability to the patent holder as the 
university is presumed to be acting in the interest of furthering 
the public good. 
In distinguishing between a university acting in the public 
interest and one acting as a market participant, the model 
holds a university accountable for its commercial activity 
without alleviating any undue delays and costs related to 
gaining access to patented research tools.  The model also 
protects the interests of patent holders, particularly those of 
the holders of patents covering research tools.  A broad 
exemption from infringement liability for university 
researchers would undermine the value of research tool patents 
as researchers tend to be “ordinary consumers” of such 
technologies.144  The current narrow exemption from 
infringement liability poses obstacles to research by imposing 
burdensome measures to avoid the risk of liability.  This 
approach strikes a balance between maintaining the incentive 
to invent and ensuring that research is not unduly hampered 
by patents on research tools. 
B.  RESEARCH TOOL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 
The model adopts a disclosure requirement similar to that 
in Professor Mueller’s development use model.145  It differs 
from Professor Mueller’s model in that the filing of a patent 
application would trigger the present disclosure requirement.  
The disclosure requirement would impose a duty on the part of 
the university user to disclose the use of a patented research 
tool at the time a patent application is filed.  This provides an 
efficient mechanism for apprising the patent holder that her 
patented research tool has been used.  Self-reporting is 
important when infringement is difficult to detect.  It is critical 
when research tools are not physically incorporated into a 
                                                          
 144. See Brief, supra note 12, at 518. 
 145. See Mueller, supra note 63. 
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marketed product or where the results obtained are patented, 
but the use is not disclosed in the patent.  In these latter cases, 
the patent holder would have no effective means to detect the 
use.  Thus, a self-reporting mechanism would ensure that a 
research tool user can be held accountable for that use. 
The disclosure requirement is envisioned as an extension 
of the patent procurement process.  The requirement would 
impose a duty on university applicants that is akin to the duty 
to disclose information material to patentability that is 
required of all applicants by the requirement for good faith and 
candor.146  Under the research tool disclosure requirement, a 
university applicant would have a duty to disclose patented 
research tools necessary to the discovery for which the patent is 
sought.  A research tool would be necessary when it materially 
affects the direction or course of the research conducted.  A 
research tool would also be necessary when used as a control so 
as to give meaning and allow for interpretation of research 
results.  As is the case with the duty to disclose information 
material to patentability, a failure to comply with the research 
tool disclosure requirement would render any patent 
subsequently issued to the researcher unenforceable.  
University researchers who choose not to respect the rights of 
other patent holders should be denied the same right. 
The duty under the disclosure requirement would not be 
contingent on the validity of the research tool patent used in 
the research.  Compliance with the disclosure requirement 
should not be taken as an acknowledgment by the university 
patentee that the patent implicated in the research is valid.  
The university would be free to refuse to compensate the patent 
holder if it deems the research tool patent invalid.  The patent 
holder, in turn, would still able to seek judicial redress as 
would be done under the existing system.  This provides a 
mechanism by which universities could challenge patents of 
questionable validity. 
C.  PREDETERMINED RESEARCH FEE 
The disclosure requirement would be unworkable, 
however, without a method for limiting liability once 
infringement, in essence, is admitted.  Thus, the model also 
requires that all patent applicants specify a research license fee 
to be applied to university users.  The predetermined fee allows 
                                                          
 146. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2001). 
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the patent holder to name her price while providing prospective 
users with notice of the cost of a patented research tool.  The 
research fee is designated by the patentee when the research 
tool patent is issued, although it can be adjusted by the patent 
holder during the patent term.  The patent holder is free to 
raise her price if the technology proves to be robust or lower her 
price if demand is low.  Changes to the fee will not be applied 
retroactively however.  Thus, the research fee is pre-
determined in the sense that prospective users of patented 
research tools are notified of the cost of that tool.  This enables 
the prospective user to make an informed decision to use a 
selected research tool or go without.  It also protects the user 
from excessive demands from the patent holder after she has 
committed to a selected research tool. 
Under the current law, the prospective gains from a patent 
infringement lawsuit against a university are often too small to 
justify the risk of having a patent narrowed or invalidated.147  
Thus, most patent holders do not recover for infringing use, 
choosing instead to tolerate university infringement.148  This 
model allows the patent holder to recover for the use of her 
research tools without having to risk an infringement law suit.  
Since the patent holder has much to gain, under ordinary 
circumstances, one would expect the patent holder to state a 
reasonable price to attract the greatest possible use.  This will 
enhance the value of the research tool and maximize recovery. 
A potential pitfall in having the patent holder name her 
price is that sometimes the stipulated price would be 
prohibitively high.  If so, the prospective university user has 
several options.  First, she can select an alternative tool.  If 
enough prospective users look elsewhere for alternative 
approaches, the value of the research tool patent may drop and 
the patent holder would be expected to adjust her price 
accordingly – that is, if the patent holder is willing to make her 
technology available to others.  In this case, the present model 
allows the patent holder and ultimately the market to 
determine the value of a patented research tool.  On the other 
hand, if selecting an alternative tool is not possible, the 
researcher can refuse to pay the specified fee, in which case the 
patent holder is free to bring suit.  In essence, the model 
provides a “short-cut” for the prospective user to gain 
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unfettered access to patented research tools and for the patent 
holder to quickly recover from her investment. 
By committing to a research fee, the patent holder has not 
forfeited the exclusive right to market the subject of her patent.  
For example, the holder of a patent covering a DNA element 
designed to isolate operative genes from a pool of genomic DNA 
still retains the right to produce and market the DNA element.  
The research fee merely notifies the would-be university 
researcher of the cost for independently synthesizing and using 
that DNA element should she choose to.  When the patent 
holder elects to produce and market the DNA element, the 
DNA element is now available for anonymous purchase and 
thus would be outside the ambit of the proposed model. 
CONCLUSION 
Current patent laws require that university researchers 
wanting to avoid the risk of patent infringement liability 
engage in ex ante negotiations with patent holders for access to 
patented research tools.  But the increasing number of patents 
on upstream research tools as well as the fragmentation of 
rights for a given innovation results in increasing transaction 
costs associated with gaining access to research tools.  This 
article sets out a method for facilitating a university’s access to 
patented research tools while enabling patent holders to recoup 
their investments in developing these tools.  The method 
utilizes a research tool disclosure requirement and a 
predetermined research fee to facilitate university access to 
patented research tools and patent holder’s recovery for that 
use.  The disclosure requirement imposes on university 
researchers who use patented research tools a duty to disclose 
that use at the time of the filing of a patent application.  The 
disclosure requirement provides notice to patent holders whose 
technology has been used in research.  The predetermine 
research fee is an amount set by the research tool patent holder 
at the time the research tool patent is issued.  It provides notice 
of the cost of a selected technology to would-be users and limits 
their liability in exchange for disclosure.  The proposed model 
alleviates the need to obtain prior consent from patent holders, 
while strengthening the value of research tool patents by 
providing a means by which patent holders can more efficiently 
monitor and recover for the use of the patented research tool. 
 
